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Equality, Conscience, and the Liberty of the Church: 
Justifying the Controversiale per Controversialius 
 
 
Patrick McKinley Brennan1 
 
 
“[I]f I affirm that without genuine and vital reconciliation between 
democratic inspiration and evangelical inspiration our hopes for the democratic 
culture of the future will be frustrated, I do not appeal to police force to obtain 
such reconciliation; I only state what I hold to be true.  It would be foolish intolerance 
to label as intolerance any affirmation of the truth which is not watered down with 
doubt, even if it does not please some of our democratic fellow-citizens.” 
 
-- Jacques Maritain, “The Pluralist Principle in Democracy”2 
 
 
I. 
 
 The disappearance of what unity in religion (and morals) characterized Europe before the 
Reformation is now the stuff of almost ancient history, but figuring out what to make of the 
resulting situation, known in the literature as “pluralism,” has today become something of a 
cottage industry.  “Pluralism” as I mean it here is shorthand for the fact that people hold and seek 
to live by all different kinds of doctrines, religious and nonreligious, liberal and illiberal.3  At one 
end of the spectrum, the view proffered is that such pluralism is a modus vivendi that is necessary 
if we are to avoid such horribles as rekindling the wars of religion and compelling false 
professions of faith; it is, in other words, no more than a prudent if honorable compromise.  The 
opposing view on offer is ambitious rather than acquiescent.  It seeks to justify this pluralism on 
the basis of basic principles about human nature, that is, on the basis of judgments that might not 
be acceptable, on metaphysical or epistemological grounds, to all concerned.  One thinks here of 
John Locke and Immanuel Kant.  Pursuers of a third way, known as “political liberalism,” also 
seek to justify pluralism, but this time on grounds that, it is said, should be acceptable to all.4  It is 
                                                 
1   John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law, Villanova University School of 
Law.  This paper was prepared for the third annual John F. Scarpa Conference on Law, Politics, and 
Culture, which was held at Villanova University on February 19, 2009.  The Conference was dedicated to a 
consideration of Martha Nussbaum’s work on religion and freedom of conscience, and I am singularly 
grateful to Professor Nussbaum for her presentation at the conference and her response to this paper.   I am 
happy to thank Michael Moreland and Kent Greenawalt for their helpful comments on a draft of the paper.  
William Weiss and Lindsay Bish also have my thanks for their assistance with the research, as does Mira 
Baric for her expert secretarial assistance.  Villanova Law Dean Mark Sargent deserves credit and gratitude 
for robust support of the annual Scarpa Conference, a forum for discussions that are unfortunately 
uncommon in today’s academy.   
2  JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RANGE OF REASON 165, 170 (1942). 
3  The pluralism I have in mind is sometimes elaborated as “values pluralism.”  This form of pluralism 
stands in contrast to a pluralism of authorities, which is discussed (and defended)  infra text at note <>.    
4   “The problem of political liberalism is to work out a political conception of political justice for a 
constitutional democratic regime that a plurality of reasonable doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, 
liberal and nonliberal, may freely endorse, and so freely live by and come to understand its virtues.”  JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xl (updated ed. 1996) (1993).  Getting such agreement may take a long 
time.  See id. at 227.  
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a version of the third, and uniquely ambitious, possibility that Martha Nussbaum pursues in 
Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality.  “The hope,” she 
explains, “is that public institutions can be founded on principles that all can share, no matter 
what their religion.”5   
Nussbuam refers to “the hope,” but hope is always someone’s (or no one’s).  A question 
that occurs, then, is: Whose is “[t]he hope” to which Nussbaum refers?  A related question 
follows:  Who is it that will “found[]” these institutions?  Taking the second question first, our 
institutions, the American political institutions that are Nussbaum’s concern in the book, have 
already been founded -- the builders have already executed what the architects designed here in 
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787,  the states have duly ratified that design, and said design has 
been amply amended.  As a result, rather than merely hope that -- or speculate about whether -- 
such institutions can be founded, one can ask whether the institutions that our Framers in fact 
founded embody “[t]he hope.”  Is Nussbaum correct that they do “not have a religious content,” 
but instead only an “ethical content,”6 and one with which everyone can agree?  
Starting with the obvious, the First Amendment’s religion clauses (as they are commonly 
called) single out “religion” for special treatment, and the historical record reveals that they do so 
because the amenders understood that  “religion” involves our duties to God.7  Yet not everyone 
can agree that religion deserves the special treatment the Constitution gives it.  Nussbaum seeks 
to eliminate the problem by arguing that what the First Amendment religion clauses protect 
should be interpreted to extend beyond religion as it was traditionally, and is usually, understood, 
to cover (almost) all claims couched in terms of “conscience,” regardless of whether they or it 
(i.e., conscience) have anything to do with God, the sacred, or the transcendent.8   
I return to Nussbaum’s account of the rights of conscience below.  The present point is 
that the religion clauses of our Constitution are premised on God’s asking something of us, and 
this assuredly is a premise that not all will share.  To take another example of a claim that not all 
will embrace, there is our Constitution’s statement of its position vis-a-vis the Almighty.  
Professor Nussbaum reports that the U.S. Constitution makes no reference whatever to God9, but 
of course the document is dated “in the Year of Our Lord.”  Our constituent instrument’s being 
thus situated within what Christians believe to be salvation history is a fact of record “Done in 
Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present,” a fact that I recently heard an 
eminent scholar of U.S. constitutional law bestir himself to regret.  Such expression of regret 
belies what Nussbaum denies or overlooks. 
   But perhaps this line of inquiry, into what the Constitution says, is too crude.  After all, 
whatever the Framers’ and amenders’ views as they got embodied in the U.S. Constitution, there 
exists an authoritative tradition of constitutional interpretation in which the spare words of the 
parchment barrier have been given ever new effect according to changing principles.  Saying 
what this tradition is, is critical to Nussbaum’s project:  “This book traces a distinctively 
American tradition of thought about religious matters, and words like ‘our tradition’ and ‘the 
American tradition’ will show up often in it.”10  Following upon this, I would add, first, that our 
                                                 
5  Martha C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS 
EQUALITY 23 (2008). 
6 Id. at 23.  
7   “Religion is special and is accorded special protection in the Constitution. ‘[W]e cannot repudiate that 
decision without rejecting an essential feature of constitutionalism, rendering all constitutional rights 
vulnerable to repudiation if they go out of favor.’”  JOHN WITTE, JR.  RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 250 (2d ed. 2005) (quoting Douglas Laycock) .  
8   “We mitigate the unfairness to nonreligious searchers as much as we possibly can, by extending the 
account of religion as far as we can, compatibly with administrability.”  NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF 
CONSCIENCE, supra note <>, at 173.  See also id. at 12-13, 19-20, 22-23, 164-74, 359.       
9 “The Constitution as a whole makes no reference to God.”  Id. at 3. 
10   Id. at 31.  
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tradition is not dispositive of where we shall go next; second, history has not been stopped by 
what we have achieved so far; third, decisions must be taken concerning a world that none of us 
has ever seen before.  Everyone can indeed agree to these three propositions, I should think.  
Nussbaum goes further, however:  “[M]any aspects of our own tradition,” she judges, “. . . are 
wrong-headed and unjust.”11   
What to do?  Criticize and reform our tradition from the resources of another?  No, there 
is, we are told, a solution closer to home.  Nussbaum’s project is to measure our tradition against 
certain “general goals and concepts” that are, she notes, “conveniently enough” “also embodied 
within it.”12  It turns out, then, that the project is one of cherry-picking from our own tradition, 
work Nussbaum summarizes in these terms: “[W]e can only say what is good about [our 
tradition] if we hold it up at every point against some general goals and conceptions that we are 
seeking to embody in concrete laws and institutions.”13  The question I would raise about this 
statement concerns its pregnancy -- the identity of the third (and italicized) “we.”  Who are the 
“we?”  Not all of us are trying to embody and entrench in the tradition the same subset of the 
tradition’s “general goals and concepts.” 
Prescinding from my unanswered question, one can go on to inquire as to the substance 
and the merits of these general goals and concepts that, we are told, this partial “we” are seeking 
thus to embody.  The quoted language, about “the hope,” occurs in Professor Nussbaum’s initial 
explication and defense of the catalogue of six “principles” that are, she seeks to demonstrate 
throughout the book, not only “conveniently” but “amply recognized in our constitutional 
tradition and in the philosophical works related to it.”14   The principles she identifies can indeed 
be found in various “philosophical works,” in the genre known as political liberalism, and they do 
purport to be acceptable to all concerned.15   
This question follows, however: Does the authoritative tradition of interpretation of the 
U.S. Constitution postulate and give effect only to “principles that all can share?”  Can one say 
simpliciter that those charged with the authoritative interpretation of our Constitution are working 
it pure of principles that not all can embrace?  The answer is plainly no, as Nussbaum’s own 
indictments of the ongoing tradition confirm.  My concern in this paper is not with this 
descriptive question, but with the normative question that ensues:  Should they be?  Should those 
charged with the authoritative implementation of our Constitution be giving it effect according to 
principles that all can share?  The answer, I shall argue, is also no.  “The hope” should not be 
your hope.   
Some will find this very disappointing, for, admittedly, “[f]inding a tertium quid” – that 
is, neither, on the one hand, justifying the status quo based on fundamental and potentially 
controversial principle about human nature nor, on the other, merely accepting the status quo as a 
                                                 
11   Id. at 32. 
12   Id. 
13   Id. (emphasis added).  I agree with Nussbaum: “[A]ny national narrative is an interpretation.  Some past 
events are made salient and others are not.  Some aspects of founding documents are brought forward and 
others are left behind.”  Martha C. Nussbaum, Toward a Globally Sensitive Patriotism, 137.3 DAEDALUS 
73, 83 (Summer 2008). 
14   NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note <>, at 22.  
15   “The hope is that this idea [justice as fairness], with its index of primary goods arrived at from within, 
can be the focus of a reasonable overlapping consensus.  We leave aside comprehensive doctrines that exist 
now, that have existed, or that might exist.”  Id. at 40.  Nussbaum’s debts to John Rawls, from a Theory of 
Justice through Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples, are vast and frequently acknowledged.  E.g., 
id. at 57-58.  She is also sometimes critical of Rawls.  See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF 
JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP ix (2008).     
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prudent modus videndi  -- “seems to be quite imperative for the political liberal.”16  Indeed, it is, 
as philosopher Michael White has also observed, their “Great Hope.”17  A principal difficulty 
with the “Great Hope,” aka “the hope,” however, is that “[i]t is,” perversely, “a matter of 
“justifying . . . the controversiale per controversialius,”18 the controversial by the even more 
controversial.  The political liberal’s project of justifying pluralism on grounds on which all can 
agree founders, I shall argue, inasmuch as it depends upon concepts that are in fact contested, and 
reasonably so.   
Furthermore, I shall argue, the reasons some of us have for disputing the grounds on 
which the political liberal would build and bound politics spring from sources that the political 
liberal systematically undervalues.  In developing this objection, I will rely on the work of the 
Thomist Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain, whose thought provided a major background 
influence on the social teachings of the Second Vatican Council.19 I am warranted in doing so, 
among other reasons, because Nussbaum not only draws on Maritain for support for her project, 
but even goes so far as to denominate him “probably” the first “political liberal[],”20 something of 
a precursor of Rawls.21  Nussbaum is surely right to raise Maritain up as a liberal, as someone 
who champions individual human rights and human equality.  I welcome Nussbaum’s 
reintroducing Maritain’s ideas into mainstream discourse, for in recent years Maritain has become 
unfortunately neglected on American campuses where his name was common a generation ago.  
And, perhaps one reason for this neglect is that Jacques Maritain is emphatically not a political 
liberal.  Jacques Maritain does not share “the hope” to limit the political sphere according to 
principles that all can be expected to embrace.22   
On the contrary, Maritain hoped and strove for, as he explained, “a new Christianly 
inspired civilization” in which “the leaven of the Gospel quicken[s] the depths of temporal 
existence.”  Finished and “done with neutrality,” such a civilization through its society and civil 
authority (the state) “would be conscious of the faith that inspired it, and it would express this 
faith publicly.”23  Maritain continues:  “As for the citizens who were unbelievers, they would 
have only to realize that the body politic as a whole was just as free with regard to the public 
expression of its own faith as they, as individuals, were free with regard to the private expression 
of their own non-religious convictions.”24  Maritian’s is not the charter of the political liberal; it 
is, however, I shall argue, a charter correlative to the claims faithful Catholics must make on 
                                                 
16   MICHAEL J. WHITE, PARTISAN OR NEUTRAL? THE FUTILITY OF PUBLIC POLITICAL THEORY 94 (1997).  
See also Patrick McKinley Brennan, Political Liberalism’s Tertium Quiddity: Neutral “Public Reason,” 43 
AM. J. JURIS. 239 (1998) (reviewing White’s book). 
17   WHITE, supra note <>, at 94.  
18  Id. at  9. 
19   Patrick McKinley Brennan, Jacques Maritain: Philosopher of Law, Politics and All That Is, in THE 
TEACHINGS OF MODERN CATHOLICISM ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE 106, 107 (John Witte, Jr. 
& Frank S. Alexander eds., 2006).  
20   “[I]t is worthy of note that the first example of political liberalism in the Western tradition is probably 
the neo-Aristotelian Thomism of Jacques Maritain.”  Martha C. Nussbaum, Political Objectivity, 32 NEW 
LITERARY HISTORY 883, 892 (2001). 
21   NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note <>, at 276.  
22   “For all his earlier attacks on liberalism, Maritain is thus a liberal and opposed to restrictions on 
freedoms of religion and expression. . . .  There is an important difference from contemporary liberalism,  
however, in Maritain’s philosophy of natural law and natural rights.”  Paul Sigmund, Maritain on Politics, 
in UNDERSTANDING MARITAIN  153, 162 (Deal W. Hudson & Matthew J. Mancini, eds., 1987).  On other 
qualifications on Martitain’s liberalism, see Michelle Watkins and Ralph Watkins, Jacques Maritain and 
the Rapprochement of Liberalism and Communitarianism, in CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, & 
COMMUNITARIANISM: THE CATHOLIC INTELLECTUAL TRADITION AND THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
DEMOCRACY  151-72 (1995).  
23   JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 159 (1951).  
24   Id. at 173.  
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behalf of, among other things, a necessary component of any true religious liberty, viz., the 
liberty of the Church, libertas ecclesiae.  A fact about the political liberalism of the sort 
Nussbaum pursues is that it cannot adequately accommodate the Catholic Church, a disability that 
Catholics should regard as a reductio.  But, for reasons to which I shall come at the end, it is not 
just Catholics or other religious believers who have ample reason to respect the groups, such as 
the Catholic Church, that vex the political liberal’s hope to eliminate societal differences, on the 
basis of allegedly uncontroversial principles.   
 
   
 
 
II. 
 
 “The hope,” as we have heard, “is that public institutions can be founded on principles 
that all can share, no matter what their religion.”  The first such principle Nussbaum discerns in 
the American constitutional tradition is this:  “The Equality Principle:  All citizens have equal 
rights and deserve equal respect from the government under which they live.”25  Conceding that 
“separation [of church and state] does have some ancillary purposes (protecting religion from 
government and government from religion),” Nussbaum goes on to assert that such separation “is 
valued primarily on account of the equality it protects.”26  Acknowledging that “[o]ur 
commitment to religious equality did not emerge immediately or easily,” Nussbaum declares: 
“Citizens, we believe, are in fact all equal.  We have not just rights, but equal rights.”  The hope, 
says Nussbaum, is that “all citizens . . . can live together in full equality.”27 According to 
Nussbaum, “[t]he philosophical tradition is very keen on this idea” of equality and equal respect, 
“and it is a linchpin of the relevant notion of religious freedom:  we want not just enough 
freedom, but a freedom that is itself equal, and that is compatible with all citizens being fully 
equal and being equally respected by the society in which they live.”28 
 I have strung together these several quotations involving equality -- “the linchpin” -- in 
order to provide a snapshot of the range of ways in which Nussbaum deploys the concept in 
Liberty of Conscience.  Later, we will follow Nussbaum as she “supplement[s]” the principle of 
equality “by an independent idea of the worth of liberty of conscience.”29   With respect to the 
principle of equality standing alone, though, there are several things to notice.  First, frequently 
the equality is said to be one (of rights) of “citizens,” and elsewhere we read:  “Closely linked to 
the idea of liberty is the idea that all citizens are equal, or, in Madison’s words, that they all enter 
the polity ‘on equal conditions.’”30  The obvious trouble with this is that people are not “citizens” 
before they “enter the polity,” and are we to imagine that Nussbaum means to limit our 
government’s constitutional obligations to those who have “entered” and officially become 
citizens?  It would be uncharitable to read Nussbaum as arguing that the religion clauses – and 
other rights-conferring clauses -- of our Constitution should now be interpreted not to extend to 
yesterday’s immigrants and today’s aliens and visitors.  But on what basis are such protections to 
be extended?  Pure favor or gratuitous privilege?  Such persons have not “enter[ed] [our] polity as 
citizens; they are, at least many of them, citizens elsewhere.  I am confident that this a problem to 
which Professor Nussbaum has a solution, and I suspect it involves people’s receiving benefits on 
                                                 
25 NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note <>, at 22.  
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 3-5.  
28 Id. at 19.  
29 The reason is that “we might have been equal by all (equally) lacking religious liberty (as philosopher 
Thomas Hobbes urged, in the seventeenth century”).  Id. at 21-22.  
30 Id. at 19. 
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some basis other than their being U.S. citizens.31  An equality based on the accident of citizenship 
leaves the unlucky out.   
 Second, and more important here, Nussbaum’s claims on behalf of normative equality – 
that is, that people should be treated equally or (what is not necessarily the same thing) as 
equals32 – bear an uncertain relationship to the (possible) claim(s) of descriptive equality.  Is 
Nussbaum’s (implicit) claim that equal treatment is called for because human persons are all 
descriptively – metaphysically, if you will -- one another’s equals?  While I do not find in the 
book a statement of the proposition that all people are in fact (that is, metaphysically) equal, it 
seems everywhere to be the subtext.  But is the claim -- that all people are one another’s equals -- 
one with which we can all be expected to agree?  
 The name we associate above all with the political liberal’s project of justifying pluralism 
on terms that all concerned can agree upon is John Rawls, and Nussbaum reports that Rawls did 
for the twentieth century what Roger Williams did for his own.33  “Like Williams,” Nussbaum 
explains,  “Rawls starts from the idea of equal respect and shows that only a political conception 
that separates certain key moral/political values from religious ideas will appropriately preserve 
that all-important value.  Separation is not a starting point.  It is a conclusion of an argument that 
begins elsewhere.34  But does Rawls in fact, as Nussbaum reports, “start[] from the idea of equal 
respect?”  
In A Theory of Justice, in a part toward the end of the book that almost nobody ever 
discusses, Rawls confessed that “[w]e still need a natural basis of equality.”35  Need, in other 
words, a starting point?  It would seem so.  But, on Rawls’s own judgment, that confession turned 
out not to be fatal to his project, for “it is not the case,” he explains immediately, “that founding 
equality on natural capacities is incompatible with an egalitarian view.  All we have to do is to 
select a range property (as I shall say) and to give equal justice to those meeting its conditions.”36 
 But what is a “range property?”  This device that is basic to Rawls’s justifying normative 
equality has not to my knowledge received much attention in the extensive literature on Rawls.37  
Recently, however, Jeremy Waldron took it up in his paper “Basic Equality,”38 where the aim, as 
                                                 
31   Perhaps it is this:  “I do not, however, endorse cosmopolitanism as a correct comprehensive doctrine.  
Further thought about Stoic cosmopolitanism, and particularly the strict form of it developed by Marcus 
Aurelius, persuaded me that the denial of particular attachments leaves life empty of meaning.  . . . .  It 
should be, instead, an uneven dialectical oscillation within ourselves, as we accept the constraints of some 
strong duties to humanity, and then ask ourselves how far we are entitled to devote ourselves to the 
particular people and places whom we love.”  Nussbaum, Toward a Globally Sensitive Patriotism, supra 
note <>, at 80. Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, In Defense of Universal Values, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 379, 408-18 
(2000). 
32 “Sometimes treating people equally is the only way to treat them as equals; but sometimes not.” RONALD 
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 190 (1985). 
33   “Roger Williams issued a challenge to the new colonies: that they find, and learn to inhabit, a shared 
moral space, without turning that space into a sectarian space that privileges some views over others.  This 
same challenge was issue in the late twentieth century by John Rawls, when he argued that people who 
hold different religious and secular ‘comprehensive doctrines’ can live together on terms of equal respect 
only if they can form an ‘overlapping consensus,’ agreeing to share a ‘freestanding’ ethical conception in 
the political realm, and agreeing, at the same time, to forgo the search for the dominance of any one 
comprehensive doctrine over the others.”  NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note <>, at 361. 
34   NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note <>, at 361. 
35   JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 508 (1971). 
36   Id. 
37   It is discussed in JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK MCKINLEY BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY 
OF A WESTERN INSIGHT 31-33 (1999). 
38   Jeremy Waldron, Basic Equality, 31-33 (New York Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper, No. 
08-61, 2008).  For citations to other places at which Rawls’s “range property” has been discussed, see id. at 
32 n.100.  
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Waldron states, is “not” “discussion of equality as an economic or social aim” but, instead, 
“discussion of the basic equality of all humans as a premise or assumption of moral and political 
thought.”39  Waldron begins by defining (as Rawls does not) a range property in the following 
terms:  “R is a range property if it is binary or non-scalar property (one either has it or one does 
not) which applies to a class of items that may also be understood in a scalar way, i.e., in terms of 
a scale measuring the degree to which an item possesses the associated scalar property S.”  He 
then refines the definition as follows:  “R is a range property with respect to S if R is binary and 
there is a scalar property, S, such that R applies to individual items in virtue of their being with a 
certain range on the scale connoted by S.”40  Rawls’s own “range property” for justifying 
normative equality turns out to be, as Waldron reports, the “capacity for moral personality.”  In 
Rawls’s own words (quoted by Waldron): 
 
It should be stressed that the sufficient condition for equal justice, the capacity 
for moral personality, is not at all stringent. . . .  Furthermore, while individuals 
presumably have varying capacities for a sense of justice, this fact is not a reason 
for depriving those with a lesser capacity of the full protection of justice.  Once a 
certain minimum is met, a person is entitled to equal liberty on a par with 
everyone else.41 
 
In sum, then, Rawls’s proposed natural basis for grounding normative equality is the capacity for 
moral personality that most – though not all persons – share to a similar – though not a uniform – 
degree.42 
 Waldron finds the range-property strategy sound, but warns that we must be careful lest 
we identify a range property that is not “important” enough to do the yeoman’s work for which it 
devised and called into service.  He writes:  “[I]f we are to single out a basis on which all humans 
are fundamentally alike, we have to be careful how we go about it.”43  Admittedly; but even such 
care may be too little too late.  Is it enough to single out a property that humans possess 
unevenly?  To be specific, is being “fundamentally alike” a sufficient basis for natural equality?  
Whence the bootstrapping?  The passage from similarity to equality is not unproblematic.44       
Equality, like liberty and justice, and perhaps fraternity, is the familiar stuff of our public 
political discourse.45 But equality, unlike its confederates, enters political life from a career in 
mathematics. No one imagines that three sides of a triangle might enjoy liberty or justice or 
fraternity, but we many people do claims that people on opposite sides of the globe are equal to 
one another. Of the idea of human equality, it is a salient but often overlooked aspect that it is 
first of all an idea of equality. No hero has fought the good fight and offered himself on what he 
regards as the altar of human similarity.  With human equality, the revolutionaries and now the 
rest of us have in mind more than the ways in which we resemble one another more or less. But 
neither do we have in mind total human sameness, a relation of the sort that in mathematics 
would be called identity; we grasp that difference makes us exactly who we are. Equality, in 
                                                 
39   Id. at 1. 
40   Id. at 33-34. 
41   Id. at 32 (quoting Rawls). 
42   Indeed, this quietly becomes the basis of Rawls’s (later-abandoned) theory of natural human rights. See 
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS 15-17 (2008). 
43 Waldron, supra note <>, at 44.  
44   “Rawls makes it clear – and I think quite rightly – that the idea of a range property is not supposed to 
solve problems (in the theory of equality) posed by marginal cases such as humans who are so severely 
intellectually disabled as to be incapable of many of the forms of functioning we regard as human.”  Id. at 
33.   
45   Patrick McKinley Brennan, Arguing for Human Equality, 18 J.L. & RELIGION 99, 106-08 (2002) (the 
next several paragraphs are adapted from this argument).  
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contrast to similarity, confirms a sameness among two or more objects; but that sameness co-
exists with differences among those objects, thereby not slipping into simple identity. Equality, if 
it does not lose its essence in the case where the objects related are not mathematical quantities 
but instead human subjects, is the idea that there is to humans sameness among difference. In the 
case of flesh and blood humans, equality is the sane halfway-house between mere similarity and 
complete identity. 
 What that sameness is, however, bald assertions of equality do not reveal and cannot. 
Simple assertions of that sort that “x’ and ‘y’ are equal” have something of what the logicians 
would call an enthymemic quality; they hide or do not explicate a premise. What remains 
unspecified  is the specific something -- call it “z”-- in virtue of which “x” and “y” are equal. Any 
equality is equality in respect of some property or quality - some “z” in virtue of which the two or 
more objects are the same. Two stones, or two people, might be equal in respect of their weight, 
but different in, say, color, kind, or quality. Two people, or two million people, might be equal in 
respect of their I.Q., but different in level of curiosity and creativity. 
When we come to the specific equality we call human equality, however, the putative 
equality obtains not just between some “x” and some “y.” It is not just between Scalia and 
Stevens, or among all Athenians or Astors, that equality is said to obtain; it holds, we are told, 
among “all men.” And neither I.Q. or weight, nor anything like them, seems available to generate 
an equality among all or even nearly all humans. We are so very different from one another. 
Some of us have two arms, others just one; a few are fast, the rest move more slowly. In numbers 
of chromosomes (of one kind), as of freckles, we are not the same as one another. 
 Despite all the differences and legion others, it might be possible, I suppose, to identify 
some empirical ability or property that humans share uniformly and thereby to make sense of the 
legion assertions that humans are equal; the abundant equality literature teems with suggestions 
of this kind. The search for a universal sameness in respect of such a property, however, would be 
misguided, at least for present purposes. The question I am asking is about the equality of humans 
that is said -- and believed -- decisively to supervene undeniable difference; and even if we were 
to identify some empirical something possessed by all humans in uniform measure, it is doubtful 
that we could have identified such an equality.  What I am after is that in respect of which 
humans are importantly equal -- equal in the sense that women and men declare, declaim, and 
even die for, and neither protein nor plasma nor anything like them, if possessed uniformly, 
would seem to fit that bill. 
 This is simply an instance of a more general point. An equality in respect of something 
trivial will itself be trivial, absent particular circumstances.46 An equality of bodyweight, for 
example, ordinarily is unimportant, and this is so because possessing a specific body weight is 
itself rather unimportant, except for contingent purposes (such as passing a physical to enlist in 
the Marines). The equality among humans that I am inquiring into is important, however -- and 
not just contingently so. It must be important enough, more specifically, to justify normative 
political equality.  And if human equality is non-contingently important, it must depend for its 
importance on the non-contingent importance of what generates it.47  Human equality, if it is 
important, will have to imbibe such importance from its generative source -- some "z" that is 
important, sameness in respect of which makes humans importantly equal.  
To sum up, it is a feature of all judgments of equality that, as Michael White notes, they 
"abstract or prescind from the features with respect to which we are not equal.”48 To posit an 
                                                 
46 For a fuller discussion of this analytic point, see COONS & BRENNAN, supra note <>, at 11-13. 
47   Human equality, like any other putatively important equality, derives its importance from its basis, its 
“z.”  However, assertions of human equality, argument on behalf of human equality, declarations of human 
equality – these owe their importance both to their content and to their context, and specifically to their 
saying is not yet evident to all, let alone self-evident.   
48 WHITE, supra note <>, at 62.  
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existent equality is itself exactly to identify sameness amidst difference. The assertion of that 
sameness, however, does not itself deny the difference sub rosa, but affirms that, amidst the 
difference, there obtains a sameness. This is a nail Lincoln hit squarely on its head in his 
encounter with Douglas (in refuting Douglas's claim that the assertion of equality in the 
Declaration of Independence referred only to whites): “I think the authors of that notable 
instrument intended to include all men, but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all 
respects. They did not mean to say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or 
social capacity….”49  Lincoln grasped with signal clarity the formal structure of equality: 
sameness among difference --nothing more, nothing less.50 
Many of the minds that set out to find an important sameness among multiform human 
difference do so, as Lincoln did, to supply the platform for an equalizing project. This worries 
Michael White, and for good reason.  Those who are eager for egalitarianism may fudge the facts 
about what exists.51  And, as history amply demonstrates, a similar temptation to mendacity holds 
for those who are anti-egalitarian in their normative aspirations.  White’s worry goes deeper, 
however.  He argues that the project of precission by which a judgment of equality is reached can 
ineluctably deliver no more than “an analytic and fairly trivial”52 equality, with the result that all 
putative discoverers of an important human equality are inevitably charlatans and spin-doctors.   
For reasons I have developed elsewhere and will not repeat here, I do not agree with 
White that we do not have sufficient reason to affirm that humans are importantly equal.  I 
believe we do.  The freight is in the verb “believe.”  I believe that the Christian revelation gives 
us good and sufficient reasons to believe that all humans are created equal and importantly so; I 
would note that Maritain shares this view.53  Furthermore, and again for reasons I have developed 
elsewhere and will not repeat here, I regard all of the other efforts with which I am familiar to 
establish an important human equality as unsuccessful; above all, I follow Bernard Williams in 
considering a failure the range of the specifically Kantian projects of equalizing by locating the 
source of personal/moral worth beyond the empirically conditioned self.54  I also find 
unpersuasive, for reasons I lack space to develop here, the Rawlsian project recently picked up by 
Jeremy Waldron, of basing normative equality on a descriptive basis that is a “range property.”  
Inasmuch as a range property is an affirmation of similarity with respect to x, it is perforce an 
implicit denial of an equality with respect to x.   
What all this means, however, is that equality ends up depending upon facts that not all 
will acknowledge.  Normative equality ends up depending upon an essentially contestable 
descriptive equality.  The result, as I suggested in beginning, is one of justifying the 
controversiale per controversialius.  
 
 
III. 
 Justifying normative equality on the basis of metaphysical equality, the controversiale 
per controversialius, is the trap that ensnares many political liberals; but not Nussbaum.  What 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
49  SANFORD A. LAKOFF, EQUALITY IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 2 (1964) (quoting Abraham Lincoln,  
Address at Springfield, Ill. (July 17, 1858)) in CREATED EQUAL? THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS 
DEBATES OF 1858 43, 82 (Paul M. Angle ed., 1958). 
50 Jacques Maritain also had firm grasp on this at once analytic and metaphysical point. See COONS & 
BRENNAN, supra note <>, at 36-37. 
51 WHITE, supra note <>, at 52-75. 
52 WHITE, supra note <>, at 62.  
53   For my own reasons, see COONS AND BRENNAN, supra note <>, at191-214; Brennan, Arguing for 
Human Equality, supra note <>, at 136-49.  Maritain’s account is different (but compatible).  See JACQUES 
MARITAIN, REDEEMING THE TIME 15-28 (1943).  
54   See Brennan, Arguing for Human Equality, supra note <>, at 129-36.  
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she leaves unclear, at least to this reader, in Liberty of Conscience, she made perfectly clear in 
(among other places) a 2001 essay titled “Political Objectivity.”  In stating and defending the 
political liberal’s limits on the bases for politics, she explains: 
 
The U.S. Declaration of Independence uses a notion of self-evident truth, as well 
as a reference to the Creator, to ground its claim of inalienable rights.  Political 
liberalism must reject this sort of language as inappropriate for the political 
sphere. . . .   [I]t must reject as well, the inclusive Deism of the founders.  Nor 
can it say, even without reference to God, that all human beings are really 
metaphysically equal, or created equal.  It must simply say, they are equal as 
citizens and have equal entitlements within the political conception.55 
 
Admitting that this can seem like “pretty thin gruel for someone who cares about equality,”56 
Nussbaum goes on to explain that it is what “respect” requires.57  
Nussbaum professes that, for her own part, “I do believe that men and women are truly 
metaphysically equal, that the equality of black and white is a fact, and so on,” but she rejects the 
path of “comprehensive” liberals, such as Kant, who “see nothing wrong with basing politics on a 
whole series of metaphysical claims.”58  Noting that such thinkers believe that human beings will 
be treated with due respect only if we use such comprehensive theories in politics, Nussbaum 
asserts that respect cuts the other way.  “[T]he many metaphysical and epistemological views 
attached to religious and other comprehensive doctrines deserve respect,” which we show, 
Nussbaum explains, by not making truth claims in politics that would “impinge on matters that 
the religions (and other doctrines) settle for themselves, in a variety of different ways.”  She 
continues: 
 
I believe that the equality of male and female is a metaphysical fact, but if 
someone says otherwise, I believe that this view should be respected, provided 
that this person is prepared to sign on to (and genuinely, not just grudgingly 
affirm) the political doctrine that men and women are fully equal as citizens – 
with all that follows from that, including fully fair equality of opportunity, 
guarantees of nondiscrimination even in private employment, equal access to the 
basic goods of life, and so forth.59 
 
Respect, then, runs out surprisingly soon.  Beliefs may be held, but certain among them may not 
acted upon in political life nor even -- and this a point I would underline -- in “private 
employment.” 
Now, no one thinks that respect requires that all beliefs must be respected no matter what 
harm they cause to others through the conduct they dictate.  Nussbaum, however, does not wait 
until impact with the Millean harm principle to curtail respect.  According to Nussbaum, “[the 
equality] principle does not imply that all religions and view of life must be (equally) respected 
by government: for some extreme views might contradict, or even threaten, the very foundations 
of the constitutional order and the equality of citizens within it.”  When, then, the Constitution 
forbids slavery and the criminal law punishes torture, to stick with the examples Nussbaum 
adduces, “people are all respected as equals, but actions that threaten the rights of others may still 
be reasonably opposed, and positions that teach the political inequality of others, while they will 
                                                 
55   Nussbaum, Political Objectivity, supra note <>, at 896.  
56   Id. at 899. 
57   Id. at 901. 
58   Id. 
59   Id. 
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not be suppressed, will still be at a disadvantage in the community, since their advocates would 
have to amend the Constitution to realize their program.”60  As we have just seen, however, it is 
Nussbaum’s view that the principle of full equality as citizens, a principle she finds embedded in 
the better part of our constitutional tradition, outlaws discrimination in “private employment.”     
“We have the great good luck to live in a nation that has taken the principle of equal 
liberty of conscience to heart in its founding document,” Nussbaum opines, but something that is 
essential to the structure and life of the Catholic Church turns out to be unconstitutional.61  No 
plausible reading of the harm principle reaches the Catholic Church’s refusal to ordain women to 
the ministerial priesthood, yet Nussbaum’s understanding of the demands of political equality 
would seem to require the Church to ordain women to the priesthood (on the same terms as men).  
Pressed for all it is worth, Nussbaum’s constitutional principle of equality would require the 
Church to do what, by the Church’s own profession, she cannot do.62   
Sometimes Nussbaum is ready to press the principle for much that it is worth, as she 
makes unmistakably clear in her essay, “Religion and Women’s Human Rights:”  “The liberty to 
treat your co-religionists unequally is simply not a legitimate prerogative of religious freedom.”63 
She mentions the Catholic Church by name and outlines litigation strategies.  At other times she 
is more measured, as in this reply to Susan Okin:  “[I]t seems illiberal to hold that practices 
internal to the conduct of the religious body itself – the choice of priests, the regulations 
concerning articles of clothing – must always be brought into line with a secular liberal 
understanding of the ultimate good.”64  But what about sometimes?      
                                                 
60 NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note <>, at 24.  
61 Id. at 360.  
62   On the Church’s profession that she lacks the power to ordain women to the ministerial priesthood, see 
Ordinatio sacerdotalis, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/ 
documents/ hf_jp-ii_apl_22051994_ordinatio-sacerdotalis_en.html.  
63    Martha C. Nussbaum, Religion and Women’s Human Rights, in RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY 
LIBERALISM 93, 125 (Paul Weithman, ed.,1997). “Religious bodies have also claimed exemption from 
certain laws of general applicability, including anti-discrimination laws.  A (sic) Catholic Church may 
refuse to accept a Jew as a member because she is a Jew; such action, usually unconstitutional, seems 
perfectly legitimate here.  More contentious is the demand of religious groups to be exempted from the 
reach of other non-discrimination statutes – for example, those dealing with gender and sexual orientation.  
The state does not require the Roman Catholic Church to admit women to the priesthood on equal terms, 
although in almost all other occupations a denial on the basis of sex would be illegal.  Some local non-
discrimination laws on sexual orientation, for example that of the city of Denver, have exempted religious 
institutions.  These are borderline cases, difficult to distinguish from those of private clubs and educational 
institutions, whose liberty to discriminate on grounds of religion and gender has steadily eroded.  Again, 
the legal questions are complex; we can only gesture in the direction of a recommendation.  But a 
promising approach would be to insist that any form of discrimination on the basis of gender, race, or 
sexual orientation should face heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause – or the analogue of 
this in the legal system in question:  Only a compelling state interest can justify such restrictions.  On the 
other hand, it should be possible to hold in some cases that the protection of religious liberty may supply 
such a compelling interest, so long as the law in question is narrowly tailored to protect that particular 
interest.”  Id. at 129-30.  
64   Martha C. Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 114 (Susan 
Moller Okin, ed., 1999).  She continues:  “I don’t like the idea of an all-male priesthood any more than 
Okin does.  Nor do I like many of the practices of Orthodox Judaism with respect to sex equality.  That is 
why I am a Reform Jew – and why I feel strong solidarity with Roman Catholics, male and female, who are 
trying to open the Church more fully to women through internal reform.  But I view these attitudes as part 
of my own comprehensive conception of the good, which happens to be that of a Kantian Jew; I do not 
view that comprehensive conception as offering good reasons for state action.  Such reasons can be rightly 
sought only from within the core of a political conception that religious and non-religious citizens can 
endorse as respectful of their differing commitments.  I think it is not wildly optimistic to suppose that such 
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IV. 
 A “political conception” of equality that could lead to the Church’s being compelled to 
ordain women – a potential knife in the heart of the Church’s freedom to be what she believes she 
is.   Because these dire results are said to be the wages of the required non-tepid embrace of 
political liberalism, and because Nussbaum says he is “probably” “the first example of political 
liberalism in the Western tradition,” and because he was a faithful Catholic with a keen sense of 
the importance both of individual human rights, including of religious liberty, as well as of the 
liberty of the Church, libertas ecclesiae -- for all of these and other reasons, one cannot but 
wonder what Jacques Maritain would say about the argument that points to a constitutional 
compulsion for the Catholic Church to ordain women.  Again, Maritain here does double-duty as 
a something of an unofficial spokesman for the contemporary socio-political teachings of the 
Catholic Church. 
 In the essay “Political Objectivity”(mentioned earlier), Nussbaum enlists Maritain in the 
Rawlsian project as follows: 
 
In Man and the State he argues that a certain sort of respect for the dignity of the 
human person, and a corresponding recognition of a core set of human rights, 
should be at the heart of the modern state – and that this view can be affirmed 
both by Catholics and other Christians, who derive it from their religious 
doctrines of the soul, and also by secular citizens, as many who believe that 
human beings are dignified creatures worthy of respect and who are averse to 
treating human beings as mere commodities.  Although Maritain clearly himself 
prefers a theistic grounding for the ideas of human rights, he refrains from 
endorsing this grounding, because he is aware that it will not be shared by all his 
fellow citizens; respect for pluralism, together with the awareness of a substantial 
political common ground, calls for restraint.65 
 
To claim that Maritain “refrains from endorsing” a “theistic grounding” for human rights is to 
overlook and contradict much that Maritain said in print.  What Maritain wrote in Man and the 
State (and over and over elsewhere) is that “the same natural law which lays down our most 
fundamental duties, and by virtue of which every law is binding, is the very law which assigns to 
us our fundamental rights. . . .  Natural law is law only because it is a participation in Eternal 
Law,” the “Divine Reason.”66  To be sure, Maritain does hold -- and the claim has great practical 
import -- that people can commit themselves and their polity to respecting natural rights for 
reasons other than the natural law reasons,67 as happened in the drafting of the Universal 
                                                                                                                                                 
a core can be found, and that it will go far to protect women’s vulnerability, while also protecting both men 
and women in their choice to worship in their own way.”  Id. at 114. 
65   Nussbaum, Political Objectivity, supra note <>, at 893.  
66   MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE, supra note <> at 95-96.  For other texts of Maritain to the same effect 
see, Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Contributions of Catholics to the Socio-Political Order, 56 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 1221, 1228-29 (2007). 
67 As the material in Man and the State cited by Nussbaum demonstrates.  Nussbaum, Political Objectivity, 
supra note <>, at 905 n.1.  However, those pages in no way support the claim that Maritain does not 
endorse the “theistic grounding” of natural rights.  He simply concedes the fairly obvious point that others 
can reach (roughly) the same place by a different metaphysical route. 
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Declaration of Human Rights,68 but Maritain does not himself “refrain from” saying why he 
thinks the bases of human rights are true, and his reasons are not a mere “prefer[ence].”   
Nor does Maritain shrink from concluding that the natural rights people receive from the 
natural law cannot in turn be used to defeat the natural law’s demands, including its being 
implemented through prudent creation and enforcement of human law.69  Maritain seeks, and bids 
us all seek, a polity in which the natural law is given temporal effect.  And, we should be clear: 
the conclusions of the natural law Maritain has in mind are not propositions on which all can be 
expected to agree, either now or in the remote future.  Again, Maritain does indeed hold that 
people who disagree with one another at the level of theory or metaphysics can come to important 
practical agreements (as about human rights) that allow them to get on with the business of 
building society and state, but Maritain does not limit the state’s jurisdiction to matters on which 
all can be expected to agree.  To be specific, Maritain anticipates the state’s enforcing (in a 
prudentially informed way, to be sure) the breadth of traditional Judeo-Christian morality, no 
doubt limiting marriage to the union of man and woman. For Maritain, the source and criterion of 
human law is traditional morality,70 granting that progress in moral insight remains both possible 
and exigent.  Along the way of history, a requirement of (at least potential) agreement of the sort 
nursed by the political liberal is no friend of Maritain’s aspirations on behalf of the body politic.71     
 There will be more to say about this, but first I must introduce another alliance, or rather 
a qualified alliance, that Nussbaum negotiates with Maritain, in Liberty of Conscience.  It is based 
on her admiration of this passage from Maritain’s essay “Truth and Human Fellowship”: 
 
There is real and genuine tolerance only when a man is firmly and absolutely 
convinced of a truth, or of what he holds to be a truth, and when he at the same 
time recognizes the right of those who deny this truth to exist, and to contradict 
him, and to speak their own mind, not because they are free from truth but 
because they seek truth in their own way, and because he respects in them human 
nature and human dignity and those very resources and living springs of the 
intellect and of conscience which make them potentially capable of attaining the 
truth he loves.72  
 
The admiration is “qualified” because, though Nussbaum follows the quotation with the generous 
admission that “[t]hat is the view of respect that animates this book,” she is constrained, by her 
substitution of “respect” for Maritain’s “tolerance,” to add: “I prefer the term ‘respect’ to 
                                                 
68   Nussbaum credits Maritain with “participat[ing] in the framing of the Universal Declaration . . . .” 
NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note <>, at 53. She also notes Maritain was “one of the 
architects of the Universal Declaration” NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note <>, at 305.  
Maritain was involved in the work preparatory to the drafting.  See MARY ANN GLENDON, TRADITIONS IN 
TURMOIL 317-19, 331-32 (2006). 
69   “The right of the people to govern themselves proceeds from Natural Law: consequently, the very 
exercise of their right is subject to the Natural Law.  If Natural Law is sufficiently valid to give this basic 
right to the people, it is valid also to impose its unwritten precepts on the exercise of this same right.”  
MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE, supra note <> at 48. 
70   “The function of law is to constrain the protervi, the perverse and the hardened, to a behavior of which 
they are not themselves capable, and also to educate men so that in the end they may cease to be under the 
law – since they themselves will voluntarily and freely do what the law enjoins, a condition reached only 
by the wise.”  JACQUES MARITAIN, INTEGRAL HUMANISM 268 (1996). 
71   Russell Hittinger makes the important point that Catholic teaching on the basis of the natural law is not 
properly understood as anticipating consensus.  RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING 
THE NATURAL LAW IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD 16-18 (2003). Consensus is not, on the Catholic view, a 
necessary condition of political legitimacy.  
72 NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note <>, at 23, 333.  
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Maritain’s ‘tolerance,’ which seems too grudging and weak.”73  With the passage thus emended, 
Nussbaum explains that “what Maritain is after” is  
 
a society that extends liberty to all its citizens’ consciences – not on the grounds 
that their view are correct, since many believe that their neighbors’ views are 
incorrect, and we need to show respect for their convictions, but on the grounds 
that we respect them as human beings and beings whose consciences are striving 
after understanding. . . .  [T]oleration in a liberal democracy . . . is based on 
respect for their consciences.74 
 
But again, this is demonstrably not what Maritain says or means to say – and the difference runs 
deep.   
 What Nussbaum does not mention is that in the essay from which she quotes, Maritain 
himself struggles at length with his own dissatisfaction with how the terms “toleration” or 
“tolerance” describe one’s relationship with those one believes to be mistaken.  Maritain explains 
there: “I prefer the word ‘fellowship’ to ‘tolerance’ for a number of reasons.”75  He prefers it, he 
elaborates, because it “connotes something positive . . . in human relationships.”  That something, 
is human personality. 
 
 [W]e are each men, each containing within himself the ontological mystery of 
personality and freedom: and it is in this very mystery of freedom and personality 
that genuine tolerance or fellowship takes root.  For the basis of good fellowship 
among men of different creeds is not of the order of the intellect and of ideas, but 
of the heart and of love.  It is friendship, natural friendship, but first and foremost 
mutual love in God and for God.  Love does not go out to essence nor to qualities 
nor to ideas, but to persons; and it is the mystery of persons and of the divine 
presence within them which is here in play.  This fellowship, then, is not a 
fellowship of beliefs but the fellowship of men who believe.76 
 
And if that is not enough to establish this is not, for Maritain, about brute respect for a faculty 
called conscience, Maritain takes things up a notch further in what he says next: 
 
The conviction each of us has, rightly or wrongly, regarding the limitations, 
deficiencies, errors of others does not prevent friendship between minds.  In such 
a fraternal dialogue, there must be a kind of forgiveness and remission, not with 
regard to ideas – ideas deserve no forgiveness if they are false – but with regard 
to the condition of him who travels the road at our side.  . . .  I distrust any easy 
and comfortable friendship between believers of all denominations.  I mean a 
friendship that is not accompanied, as it were, by a kind of compunction or soul’s 
sorrow; just as I distrust any universalism which claims to unite in one and the 
same service of God, and in one and the same transcendental piety – as in some 
World’s Fair Temple – all forms of belief and all forms of worship.77 
 
                                                 
73 Id. at 24.  
74 Id. at 333.  
75   JACQUES MARITAIN, ON THE USE OF PHILOSOPHY 32 (1961).  
76   Id. at 35.  
77   Id. at 35, 38 
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It hardly needs mentioning that these are not principles with which all can be expected to agree 
(for example, I do not suppose Nussbaum will find them reasonable), no matter how much time 
we allow for reaching such agreement. 
 To be clear, Maritain does not deny that conscience should be respected; indeed, he 
explicitly, repeatedly, and insistently calls for it to be respected.78  Furthermore, it needs to be 
added that Maritain decisively repudiated his early argument in favor of a privileged place for the 
Catholic Church in the state, and came to hold the view, which he never retracted, that the state 
should not establish or otherwise privilege a particular church, for to do so would be to injure the 
temporal common good by disrespecting some citizens.79  But it is also true that in the same book, 
Man and the State, Maritain took the following position, which he likewise never retracted:  The 
U.S. Constitution, which Maritain regards as a “peerless” achievement,  
 
can be described as an outstanding lay Christian document tinged with the 
philosophy of the day.  The spirit and inspiration of this great political Christian 
document is basically repugnant to the idea of making human society stand aloof 
from God and from any religious faith.  Thanksgiving and public prayer, the 
invocation of the name of God at the occasion of any major official gathering, 
are, in the practical behavior of the nation, a token of this very same spirit and 
inspiration.80   
 
One may abjure these views, but one cannot correctly deny that they are Maritain’s:  “Democracy 
can only live on Gospel inspiration.”81  In Paul Sigmund’s opinion, “Maritain seems to think that 
                                                 
78   According to Maritain, the human person’s first natural right “is that of the human person to make its 
way toward its eternal destiny along the path which its conscience has recognized as the path indicated by 
God.  With respect to God and the truth, one has not the right to choose according to his own whim any 
path whatsoever, he must choose the true path, in so far as it is in his power to know it.  But with respect to 
the state, to the temporal community, and to the temporal power, he is free to choose his religious path at 
his own risk, his freedom of conscience is a natural, inviolable right.”    JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS 
OF MAN AND NATURAL 81-82 (1971).  See also, e.g., MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE, supra note <>, 
at150.  On conscience’s duties, see id. at 73-74.   
79  “Once the political society has been fully differentiated in its secular type, the fact of inserting into the 
body politic a particular or partial common good, the temporal common good of the faithful of one religion, 
even though it were the true religion, and of claiming for them, accordingly, a privileged juridical position 
in the body politic, would be inserting into the latter a divisive principle and, to that extent, interfering with 
the temporal common good.”  Id. at 175-76.  See also Brennan, Jacques Maritain, in THE TEACHING OF 
MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE, supra note <>, at 135-36.  “Maritain is at 
pains to emphasize the primacy of the spiritual.  From the religious point of view, the common good of the 
body politic implies an intrinsic though indirect ordination to something which transcends it.  In its own 
order the state is under the command of no superior authority, but the order of eternal life is superior in 
itself to the order of temporal life.  The two orders need not create a conflict . . .   Maritain’s genius lies in 
his appropriation of a tradition that has its roots in the Gospels but one which has developed through twenty 
centuries in the West.  It is a tradition which recognizes two orders, a natural hierarchy between them, and 
the need for the common good of society to prevail when inevitable tensions arise.  While political contexts 
vary, man is by nature a citizen of two cities.  That government is best which recognizes this fact and 
impedes growth in neither domain.”  JUDE P. DOUGHTERTY, JACQUES MARITAIN: AN INTELLECTUAL 
PROFILE 17, 25 (2003).  “The common good may require the toleration of a good deal of vice rather than 
radical attempts to eradicate evil by measures for which the citizenship is note prepared.”  Louis Dupre 
,The Common Good and the Open Society, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM 172, 192 (R. Bruce  Douglass 
and David Hollenbach, eds., 1994).   
80   MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE, supra note <> at 183-84.  
81   Id. at 61. 
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theism is necessary to the maintenance of a free society, but he never makes a convincing 
argument for this proposition.”82 
For Maritain, respect for conscience is demanded by -- indeed, is derivative of -- his 
understanding of human personality or personhood, not by political conceptions with which all 
supposedly can agree.  According to Maritain, “personality is [a] mystery . . . a participat[ion] in 
the very life of God.”83  As Maritain understands things, this mystery – including, specifically, our 
natural law participation in the eternal law – is the foundation of the political realm; this is the 
foundation of the equality among humans Maritain articulated and championed.84  The distance 
from “the hope” is impassable.85  To repeat, Maritain does concede that people can and do come 
together in political society and cooperate therein on bases that are less than those Maritain 
regards as the true basis, but, out of fairness to Maritain and to the practical truth of the matter, it 
is important to highlight the particular content of the deeply shared beliefs that Maritain believes 
are necessary if rights are to be recognized and respected.  Maritain avers that politics, if not 
based in shared, deep Gospel commitments, of a kind thoroughly inimical to political liberalism, 
will become degraded: 
 
Thus it is that men possessing quite different, even opposite metaphysical or 
religious outlooks, can converge, not by virtue of any identity of doctrine, but by 
virtue of an analogical similitude in practical principles, toward the same 
practical conclusions, and can share in the same practical secular faith, provided 
that they similarly revere, perhaps for quite diverse reasons, truth and 
intelligence, human dignity, freedom, brotherly love, and the absolute value of 
moral good. . . .  The important thing for the body politic is that the democratic 
sense be in fact kept alive by the adherence of minds, however diverse, to this 
moral charter.86   
 
This – broad and deep commitment to “truth and intelligence, human dignity, freedom, brotherly 
love, and the absolute value of moral good” -- is not the wellspring of a political liberal, not the 
simple result of an overlapping consensus.  It amounts to an insistence on specifically Christian 
motivation and content, which in turn will lead, as we have seen, to human law shaped 
(prudentially, of course) to give effect to the contents of the natural law (and derivative natural 
rights).  If I have belabored the point, this is because I regard Maritain’s positions as worthy of 
careful study.  While I greatly admire Nussbaum’s recovery of Maritain, I find her attempt to 
colonize his commitments especially puzzling in light of the man’s unwavering insistence, 
manifest on every page he ever wrote, upon living, even in the political sphere, by the (Christian) 
truth, not just what people(s) can be expected to agree upon.87  
                                                 
82   Paul E. Sigmund, Maritain on Politics, in UNDERSTANDING MARITAIN: PHILOSOPHER AND FRIEND 153, 
169 (Deal Hudson & Matthew Mancini eds., 1988).  
83   JACQUES MARITAIN, SCHOLASTICISM AND POLITICS, 50, 52 (1940).  
84   JACQUES MARITAIN, REDEEMING THE TIME, 15-19 (1946).  On Maritain’s natural-law liberalism, see 
Brennan, Jacques Maritain, in THE TEACHING OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS AND HUMAN 
NATURE, supra note <>, at 113-38; Sigmund, Maritain on Politics, in UNDERSTANDING MARITAIN: 
PHILOSOPHER AND FRIEND, supra note <>, at 161-64, 168-69. 
85 According to Maritain, the distinction between person and individual is “the fundamental subject of all 
social and political philosophy.”  JACQUES MARITAIN, SCHOLASTICISM AND POLITICS 56 (1940). 
86   MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE, supra note <>, at 111, 112.  
87   Nussbaum writes:  “Maritain defends democracy against Platonism not by retreating to skepticism about 
the good – for he agrees with Aristotle that we can present cogent arguments for preferring one picture of 
the human good to another – but by appealing to the worth of personal reflection and its relation to the 
dignity of persons.  This is a basically Aristotelian thought, even if we may doubt how far Aristotle would 
agree with Maritain’s institutional argument.  For Maritain, democratic choice, even when it produces 
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 And so, to return to my main theme, while Nussbaum is scrupulous about avoiding 
metaphysical equality for use in the political sphere, but she lets down her guard against 
metaphysics when it comes to conscience.  It is a foundational claim of Liberty of Conscience that 
toleration in a politically liberal democracy is based on respect for conscience, and, as with 
equality, conscience can do the work required of it by the political liberal only by being 
something all can be expected to agree about.  Equality, for its part, became allegedly 
uncontroversial by being only among citizens (as opposed to among persons, metaphysically, so 
to speak).  But what about conscience?  Nussbaum, drawing on Roger Williams, regards 
conscience as our human “faculty of inquiring and searching”88  “for life’s ultimate meaning.”89  
“Conscience is precious, worthy of respect, but it is also vulnerable, capable of being wounded 
and imprisoned.”90   
 Are these claims with which all can be expected to agree?  Is the imputation of such a 
“faculty” called conscience not destined to be controversial?  Is the existence of a faculty called 
conscience no less reasonably contestable than metaphysical equality?  Interestingly, 
notwithstanding conscience’s foundational place in the argument of Liberty of Conscience, 
Nussbaum says very little about conscience in the book.91  We are almost assumed to know what 
it is all about.  I submit, however, that conscience, that which Nussbaum teaches we must respect 
and respect equally, is not something about which all can be expected to agree. 
 To be sure, there exists a long tradition of postulating the existence of a faculty called 
conscience, and Nussbaum relies on some of it.92  Some Thomists, however, to pick one 
counterexample, outright deny that conscience is a “faculty,” regarding it instead as only the 
particular judgments of practical reason.93  And others, without taking a position on what 
conscience is, if it “is” at all, raise serious questions that ensure that we cannot make claims about 
conscience that avoid the possibility of being contested, and reasonably so: 
 
What is “conscience” anyway?  Is it some discrete faculty or cognitive power – a 
sort of sublime Jiminy Cricket chirping truth into our souls?  Or, alternatively, is 
“conscience” merely a label we attach to the conclusions of our moral reasoning?  
-- or perhaps to our opinions (however come by) on moral questions?  When we 
discuss, say, the question of conscientious objection from military service, can 
we even be confident that we are all referring to the same thing?  Or that we 
                                                                                                                                                 
mistaken outcomes, and enacts the disesased preferences of those who have made a mistake about the 
good, espresses a value that is itself essential to human flourishing, and indeed a sine qua non of all other 
values – namely, the value of choice.”  MARTHA NUSSBAUM, PLATO’S REPUBLIC: THE GOOD SOCIETY AND 
THE DEFORMATION OF DESIRE 28 (Bradley Lecture Series Publication, Library of Congress 1997).  
However, if “choice” is used to enact a “law” that violates the moral law, Maritain’s response is decisive:  
“It is essential to a philosophy such as that of St. Thomas to regard an unjust law as not obligatory.  It is the 
counterpart of this truth that the just law binds in conscience because it binds by virtue of the Natural Law. 
If we forget one, we forget the other.”  Jacques Maritain, Natural Law and Moral Law, in MORAL 
PRINCIPLES OF ACTION: MAN’S ETHICAL IMPERATIVE 67, 76 (Ruth Anshen ed., 1971) (emphasis added).   
88   NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note <>, at 169. 
89   Id. at 19. 
90   Id. 
91   “Conscience has been much neglected by philosophers.”  TIMOTHY C. POTTS, CONSCIENCE IN 
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (1980). 
92   Nussbaum invokes the Stoic account but rejects that part of that renders conscience invulnerable.  
NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note <>, at 53, 81.  
93  For St. Thomas’s view, see ERIC D’ARCY, CONSCIENCE AND ITS RIGHT TO FREEDOM (1961):  “Properly 
speaking, conscience is neither a faculty nor a habit, but an act: the act of applying knowledge to conduct.”  
Id. at 45.   See also Patrick McKinley Brennan, The “Right” of Religious Liberty of the Child: Its Meaning, 
Measure, and Justification, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 129, 139-49 (2006) (criticizing the “faculty” version 
of conscience and suggesting an alternative based on the unrestricted desire to know).     
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mean the same thing that more historically removed figures such as [Thomas] 
More (or Madison, or Locke, or Roger Williams) mean when they uttered the 
word?94 
 
Furthermore, even if one grant arguendo the existence of a faculty called conscience, what of the 
further claim, crucial to Nussbaum’s argument, that this faculty is fragile and “vulnerable”95, so 
much so that states and politics must show it no disrespect?96 
 I do not approve coercion by observing that the claims about conscience’s existence 
and its fragility are not uncontroversial.  I believe, with Maritain and the Catholic Church, that 
conscience – or, better, persons’ judgments of practical reason about ultimate things -- should be 
respected, up to a point97, and, for my part, I am not unsympathetic to the claim that reaching 
such judgments is a process fraught with risk of intimidation, and so forth.  Nor do I deny that 
some of the Founders’ held these or very similar views about “conscience.”  My point is to deny 
that they are any less controversial than claims that, say, theistic religion deserves special 
protection.  
 
V. 
 If any doubt remains about whether Jacques Maritain is a political liberal, an ally in the 
project to limit the political sphere to what all can agree on, it should vaporize as one listens to 
what Maritain has to say about libertas ecclesiae, the liberty of the Church.  The Church, he says, 
is a “true and genuine society” with a right to “the freedom of developing her own institutions 
and governing herself without interference by the body politic.”98  Maritain anticipates that the 
Christian believer will affirm this because she or he believes that “the Church is a supernatural 
society, both divine and human . . . . which unites in itself men as co-citizens of the Kingdom of 
God and leads them to eternal life . . . .”99  According to Maritain, the Christian will also share the 
reasons he (Maritain) anticipates the unbeliever will have for acknowledging the freedom of the 
Church: 
 
In his [the unbeliever’s] eyes the Church, or the Churches, are in the social community 
particular bodies which must enjoy that right to freedom which is but one, not only 
with the right to free association naturally belonging to the human person, but with the 
right freely to believe the truth recognized by one’s conscience, that is, with the most 
basic and inalienable of all human rights.  Thus, the unbeliever, from his own point of 
                                                 
94   Steven Smith, Interrogating Thomas More: The Conundrums of Conscience, 1 U. ST. THOMAS. L.J. 
580, 586 (2003).  See also Brennan, The “Right” of the Child to Religious Liberty: Its Meaning, Measure, 
and Justification, supra note <>, at 129.  
95 NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note <>, at 19.  
96  Like the Stoics whom Nussbaum castigates for not appreciating conscience’s vulnerability, the author of 
this verse of the hymn “Faith of Our Fathers,” sung at the funeral of  President Franklin Roosevelt, is at 
pains to extol conscience’s potential fortitude :   
 
     Our fathers, chained in prisons dark, 
     Were still in heart and conscience free: 
     And truly blest would be our fate, 
     If we, like them, should die for thee 
 
HENRI F. HEMY, FAITH OF OUR FATHERS (1684, 1849, 1940).  
97   Again, no one is of the view that every action is acceptable if couched in terms of conscience’s 
demands.  See supra text at note <>.  See MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE, supra note <>. 
98   Id. at 152. 
99   Id. at 151. 
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view – I mean, of course, the unbeliever who, at least, is not an unbeliever in reason, 
and, furthermore, who is a democratically-mind unbeliever, acknowledges as a normal 
and necessary thing the freedom of the Church, or of the Churches.100  
 
The right of the individual to form and follow conscience is tied up with the libertas ecclesiae 
because, first, it sometimes leads to the individual’s associating himself with other believers in 
the society that is the Church and, second, the Church has a God-given mission to attract people 
to herself by preaching the Gospel and sharing the sacraments.  The individual Catholic, to be 
specific, cannot follow or form his conscience without being associated with others in the Church, 
and the Church cannot be herself – and cannot minister to her members or evangelize others – 
unless she is treated as a rights-bearing society free from (unwarranted) interference.   
 Broadening the perspective, the landscape Maritain sketches and encourages is one he 
refers to as “pluralism.” Here, pluralism refers not to diversity of comprehensive doctrines but to 
a plurality of authorities.  It refers to multiple groups, each under its respective authority, co-
existing, sometimes in tension, but consistently respected, as a matter of right, by the state, by one 
another, and by individuals.  “As opposed to the various totalitarian conceptions of political 
society in vogue today,” Maritain wrote in 1938, “the conception here is of a pluralist body politic 
bringing together in its organic unity a diversity of social groupings and structures, each of them 
embodying positive liberties.”101  Within these groupings, individuals form their consciences and 
make themselves who they are to be (in the face of divine judgment).  To be sure, there are limits 
(for example, as mentioned above in connection with “establishment,” the Church is limited by 
the state’s just claims on behalf of social order), but, as Maritain sees it, such associations are 
presumptively free to govern themselves and to attract and discipline members. 
 Liberalism need not slight associations102, but, as a matter of fact, groups (as 
associations tend to be called when sociality is not considered essential to human nature) come in 
for mixed treatment in Nussbaum’s work.  In replying to Professor Okin, for example, Nussbaum 
puts in a plea for a measure of respect for groups.103  Elsewhere, however, Nussbaum asks:  
“What is a ‘group’ anyway?  As Joyce’s Leopold Bloom said of that equally overrated concept 
‘nation,’ it is neither more nor less than ‘the same people living in the same place’ (or, as the case 
may be, not in the same place).”104  This is not a promising start for a healthy respect of pluralism 
as a form of respect for groups and their rights.   
 In the modern world that is Nussbaum’s concern and project, a lot rides on the success 
of claims made solely in the name of individual conscience.  To be specific, the principle of 
liberty of conscience has been raised to the task that used to be accomplished by the principle of 
libertas ecclesiae.  Two generations ago John Courtney Murray, S.J., summarized in the 
following terms the project Nussbaum champions today:  “The freedom of the Church was 
discarded. . . . .  The key to the whole new political edifice was the freedom of individual 
conscience. . . .  The freedom of the individual conscience, constitutionally guaranteed, would 
supply the armature of immunity to the sacred order, which now became, by modern definition, 
precisely the order of private conscience.”105  Murray continues, anticipating Nussbaum with 
ominous exactitude: 
                                                 
100   Id. at  150-51. 
101   JACQUES MARITAIN, INTEGRAL HUMANISM 163 (Notre Dame Univ. Press 1973).  
102   Nicolas Wolterstorff, Why We Should Reject What Liberalism Tells Us about Speaking and Acting in 
Public for Religious Reasons, in RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM, supra note <>, at 162, 164.  
103  Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? supra note <>, at 113-
14.   
104   Martha C. Nussbaum, Religion and Women’s Human Rights, in RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY 
LIBERALISM, supra note <>, at 127.  
105   JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS, 206 (1960).  “The superiority of the Church, her 
end, her constitution are the ultimate basis for [the libertas ecclesiae], though in our times the libertas 
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It was an essential part of modernity’s hope that the moral consensus upon which every 
society depends for its stability and progress could be sustained and mobilized simply 
in terms of a fortunate coincidence of individual judgments, apart from all reference to 
a visibly constituted spiritual and moral authority.  Has this hope proved valid?106 
 
“The hope” springs eternal, as we have seen.  But with Nussbaum and most (though by no means 
all) political liberalism, the coercive power of the state is poised to act on groups to bring them 
into alignment or “congruence,”107 “transform[ing] every institution of civil society” in political 
liberalism’s own image.108  Nussbaum is concerned to eliminate hierarchy109, but meanwhile the 
Catholic Church regards herself as essentially hierarchical.110 
  To claims on behalf of the rights of groups, that is, group rights, the political liberal 
might be tempted to respond:  These are contestable.  I agree; indeed, they are perhaps even more 
contestable that claims on behalf of the rights of substantial persons.  However, I submit that the 
ontology of group persons and their rights is no more contestable than that of human equality or 
of conscience as a (fragile) faculty.  If equality and conscience are in, so pari passu should be 
group persons and their rights.  In sum, the principle of equal liberty of conscience is a principle 
no less controversial than claims of group rights.         
 
VI. 
 There is, though, another reply to the objection that group persons and their claimed 
rights depend upon contestable ontological premises, and it is with this that I would like to 
conclude.  I borrow here from William Galston, whose chosen path is not political liberalism but 
liberal pluralism.  Galston observes that human life “consist[s] in a multiplicity of spheres, some 
overlapping, with distinct natures and/or inner norms.”111  Liberal pluralism of the sort Galston 
defends proceeds “more empirically by considering the diverse forms of human sociability and 
association.”112  It is a “politics of recognition rather than of construction,”113 because it does not 
claim that families and churches are normed and structured in the way, say, people gather on a 
train platform.  It respects the fact that humans following and forming their consciences associate 
                                                                                                                                                 
ecclesia[e] is often indirectly based, so to speak, on the personal rights of her children.”  Hans Rommen, 
Church and State, 12.3 REVIEW OF POLITICS 321, 337 (1950).  
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and Moral Dilemmas: Why “Freedom of Conscience” is Bad for “Church Autonomy”, GEO. J. ON LAW & 
PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming  2009). 
107   ROBERT POST & NANCY ROSENBLUM, CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 13 (2002).  “The ‘logic of 
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112   Galston, supra note <>, at 109.  
113   Id. at 106.  
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in ways that are both contestable and sometimes essential to individuals’ following the 
conscience on behalf of which Nussbaum argues so powerfully.  Equal respect of conscience 
leads, on Nussbaum’s analysis, to the threat of forcing the Catholic Church to ordain women.  By 
contrast, respect for the Church would lead to respect for individuals’ freedom to join the Church 
or to leave the Church, and, correlatively, for the Church to govern herself and her members.   
 Make no mistake about it:  In the Catholic Church, as in some other churches, people 
hear that God is not to be left at the altar; people are taught there that no part of human existence 
is immune from the divine call.  “The hope” cannot be your hope, then, if you believe that you are 
called to live a religiously integrated existence.114  But if you remain tempted by the political 
liberal’s plan to disrespect you by demanding that you commit to structuring public discourse and 
life on a different set of principles than your private life, recall that the political liberal’s plea rests 
on grounds that are as contestable as anything the Catholic Church teaches about, say, the 
Church’s lack of power to ordain women.  And, finally, if you still remain on the fence, meditate 
on what freedom of speech and religion, which I cherish, makes it possible for people to say and 
believe about the search in which you and your co-religionists are engaged: 
 
[I]f we really think of the hope of a transcendent ground for value as 
uninteresting or irrelevant to human ethics, as we should, then the news of its 
collapse will not change the way we think and act.  It will just let us get on with 
the business of reasoning in which we were already engaged.115 
 
Professor Nussbaum thus professes, in the Harvard Law Review, that the transcendent ground for 
value has collapsed.116  But you need not believe that, and, at least for now, the churches remain 
more or less free to embody, and otherwise teach, what F.W.Maitland knew: 
 
When . . . a body of twenty, or two thousand, or two hundred thousand men bind 
themselves together to act in a particular way for some common purpose, they 
create a body, which by no fiction of law, but by the very nature of things, differs 
from the individuals of whom it is constituted . . . . 
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Let the moral philosopher explain this, let him explain it him explain it as 
illusion, let him explain it away; but he ought not to leave it unexplained, nor, I 
think will he be able to say that it is an illusion which is losing power, for, on the 
contrary, it seems to me to be persistently and progressively triumphing over 
certain philosophical and theological prejudices.117 
 
With Martha Nussbaum, I say yes to human equality, yes to freedom of conscience; but I also say 
yes to the freedom of the churches.  It is emphatically not my hope that everyone will agree with 
me, only that I and the churches – not just lone consciences -- will receive a respectful hearing for 
a true and vital pluralism of authorities, which can coexist with the pluralism of values in which 
we find ourselves given to live. 
 
 
                                                 
117   FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, STATE, TRUST, AND CORPORATION 63, 68 (David Runcimand & Magnus 
Ryan eds., 2003). 
